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AN OVERVIEW OF TORUS FULLY HOMOMORPHIC ENCRYPTION

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ABSTRACT. The homomorphic encryption allows us to operate on encrypted data, making any action less vulnerable to hacking. The implementation of a fully homomorphic cryptosystem has long been impracticable. A breakthrough was achieved only in 2009 thanks to Gentry [C. Gentry, Fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattices, *STOC '09: Proceedings of the forty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing*, Association for Computing Machinery, New York, (2009) 169–178.] with his innovative idea of bootstrapping. TFHE is a torus-based fully homomorphic cryptosystem using the bootstrapping technique. This paper aims to present TFHE from an algebraic point of view.

1. Introduction

A fundamental tool in the field of data security and privacy is of course provided by cryptography. However, in traditional cryptographic schemes, data must be decrypted before being manipulated. A completely different approach is given by *homomorphic encryption*, which allows to operate directly on encrypted data, with advantages in terms of privacy and simplification of processes. The term “homomorphic” refers to a cryptosystem where the encryption function is a homomorphism between algebraic structures.

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Recall that a cryptosystem is a five-tuple $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ of finite sets, where \mathcal{P}, \mathcal{C} and \mathcal{K} are respectively the sets of plaintexts, ciphertexts and keys, \mathcal{E} and \mathcal{D} are respectively the sets $\{e_k : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{C} \mid k \in \mathcal{K}\}$ and $\{d_k : \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{P} \mid k \in \mathcal{K}\}$ such that for any encryption function $e_{k_1} \in \mathcal{E}$ there is a decryption function $d_{k_2} \in \mathcal{D}$ such that $d_{k_2}(e_{k_1}(x)) = x$ for all $x \in \mathcal{P}$. The cryptosystem is probabilistic if, for some finite set \mathcal{S} , each e_k is a function from $\mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{S}$ to \mathcal{C} , each d_k is a function from \mathcal{C} to \mathcal{P} and for any encryption function e_{k_1} in \mathcal{E} there is a decryption function d_{k_2} in \mathcal{D} such that $d_{k_2}(e_{k_1}(x, r)) = x$ for all $x \in \mathcal{P}$ and $r \in \mathcal{S}$.

1.1. Homomorphic encryption. In literature, a cryptosystem $(\mathcal{P}, \mathcal{C}, \mathcal{K}, \mathcal{E}, \mathcal{D})$ is called (*partially*) *homomorphic* if, for some binary operations \cdot on \mathcal{P} and $*$ on \mathcal{C} , the algebraic structures

- (i) (\mathcal{P}, \cdot) and $(\mathcal{C}, *)$ are semigroups, and
- (ii) any $e_{k_1} \in \mathcal{E}$ is a homomorphism, that is

$$e_{k_1}(x) * e_{k_1}(y) = e_{k_1}(x \cdot y)$$

for all $x, y \in \mathcal{P}$. This implies that $d_{k_2}(e_{k_1}(x) * e_{k_1}(y)) = x \cdot y$. Similarly, we say that a probabilistic cryptosystem is (partially) homomorphic if

- (i) (\mathcal{P}, \cdot) and $(\mathcal{C}, *)$ are semigroups, and
- (ii) for any $x, y \in \mathcal{P}$ and $u, v \in \mathcal{S}$, there exists $t \in \mathcal{S}$ such that

$$e_{k_1}(x, u) * e_{k_1}(y, v) = e_{k_1}(x \cdot y, t),$$

whenever $e_{k_1} \in \mathcal{E}$. As before, this implies that $d_{k_2}(e_{k_1}(x, u) * e_{k_1}(y, v)) = x \cdot y$.

More generally, we say that a probabilistic cryptosystem is *somewhat homomorphic* if \mathcal{P} and \mathcal{C} are each equipped with two operations, say $+, \cdot$ for \mathcal{P} and $\oplus, *$ for \mathcal{C} , and

- (i) $(\mathcal{P}, +, \cdot)$ and $(\mathcal{C}, \oplus, *)$ are rings,
- (ii) there exists $\mathcal{U} \subseteq \mathcal{S}$, with $\mathcal{U} \neq \emptyset$, such that, for any $x_i, y_i \in \mathcal{P}$ and any $u_i, v_i \in \mathcal{U}$, there exist $t, z \in \mathcal{S}$ for which

$$(1.1) \quad e_{k_1}(x_1, u_1) \oplus e_{k_1}(x_2, u_2) = e_{k_1}(x_1 + x_2, t)$$

$$(1.2) \quad e_{k_1}(y_1, v_1) * e_{k_1}(y_2, v_2) = e_{k_1}(y_1 \cdot y_2, z),$$

whenever $e_{k_1} \in \mathcal{E}$. In addition, the cryptosystem is *fully homomorphic* if the elements t and z belong to \mathcal{U} .

As a consequence, for a somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem, we could perform other additions or multiplications: for example, $e_{k_1}(x_1 + x_2, t) \oplus e_{k_1}(x_2, u_2)$, if $t \in \mathcal{U}$, or $e_{k_1}(y_1 \cdot y_2, v) * e_{k_1}(y_2, v_2)$, if $v \in \mathcal{U}$. On the other hand, for a fully homomorphic cryptosystem where $\mathcal{P} = \mathcal{C}$, and any function

$$f : \underbrace{\mathcal{P} \times \dots \times \mathcal{P}}_m \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$$

such that $f(x_1, \dots, x_m)$ is given by some additions and multiplications of the x_i 's in the ring \mathcal{P} , we have

$$d_{k_2}(f(e_{k_1}(x_1, u_1), \dots, e_{k_1}(x_m, u_m))) = f(x_1, \dots, x_m)$$

for all $x_i \in \mathcal{P}$ and $u_i \in \mathcal{U}$.

The origin of fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is the pioneering paper [12], where Rivest, Adleman and Dertouzos introduced the concept of privacy homomorphism and showed some examples of homomorphic cryptosystems, one of which was RSA. Among other things, they posed the following question: *For what algebraic systems does a useful privacy homomorphism exist?* This question remained unsolved until 2009 when Gentry put forward a first fully homomorphic cryptosystem [7] (see also [6]). His innovative idea consists in taking a probabilistic somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem and make it “fully homomorphic”. To this aim, it is needed to “clean” data before proceeding with further operations. This technique is called *bootstrapping* and can be described as follows.

Consider a probabilistic somewhat homomorphic cryptosystem. Suppose further that, for a given plaintext x , the element $(x, t) \in \mathcal{P} \times \mathcal{S}$ is *noisy*, in the sense that $t \in \mathcal{S} \setminus \mathcal{U}$. Then, for a new encryption function $g_k : \mathcal{C} \rightarrow \mathcal{C}$, depending on the *bootstrapping key* $k = e_{k_3}(k_1)$ for some $k_3 \in \mathcal{K}$, the bootstrapping enables to reduce the noise: indeed, it yields an element $u \in \mathcal{U}$ such that $g_k(e_{k_1}(x, t)) = e_{k_1}(x, u)$. Similarly, if $y \in \mathcal{P}$ and $z \notin \mathcal{U}$, we get $g_k(e_{k_1}(y, z)) = e_{k_1}(y, v)$ for some $v \in \mathcal{U}$. Hence, instead of $e_{k_1}(x_i, u_i) \oplus e_{k_1}(x, t)$ or $e_{k_1}(y_i, v_i) * e_{k_1}(y, z)$, one can compute $e_{k_1}(x_i, u_i) \oplus e_{k_1}(x, u)$ or $e_{k_1}(y_i, v_i) * e_{k_1}(y, v)$.

1.2. Fully homomorphic encryption over the torus. Following Gentry’s scheme, many other FHE cryptosystems were introduced but all these had a common issue: the bootstrapping took too long to run (minutes) and the bootstrapping key was too large (gigabytes). We refer to [1, Table 3] for a more detailed account. For the sake of completeness, we also mention the existence of fully homomorphic schemes without bootstrapping (see [1] and references therein).

In 2015, Ducas and Micciancio [5] presented a new method to reduce the running time of the bootstrapping procedure. Their work inspired the birth of the TFHE cryptosystem [2], which runs the bootstrapping in terms of milliseconds and produces a bootstrapping key whose size is measured in megabytes rather than gigabytes (see [2, Section 8] for experimental running time).

The letter T in TFHE stands for *torus*, indeed as platform group is used the real torus $\mathbb{T} = \mathbb{R}/\mathbb{Z}$. The algebraic structure $(\mathbb{T}, +)$ is an abelian group and thus it can be seen as a \mathbb{Z} -module in a canonical way. TFHE is implemented in CONCRETE, an open-source library introduced in [3]. Of course, working with finite precision of 32 or 64 bits, the elements of \mathbb{T} are actually those of its submodule

$$\mathbb{T}_q = \left\{ \frac{i}{q} \mid i \in \mathbb{Z}_q \right\} = \left\{ 0, \frac{1}{q}, \dots, \frac{q-1}{q} \right\}$$

where $q = 2^r$ and r is either 32 or 64; here \mathbb{Z}_q is the group of integers modulo q . Note also that in CONCRETE, for technical requirements, the elements of \mathbb{T}_q are identified with the elements of \mathbb{Z}_q .

We point out that, over \mathbb{Z}_q , TFHE only satisfies property (1.1) in the definition of a fully homomorphic cryptosystem, *provided that at least one bit of padding is left in the plaintext*. Nevertheless, the bootstrapping is *programmable*, in the sense that it allows us to evaluate at the same time a given function on the input ciphertext while reducing the noise. This implies that the product $x \cdot y = \frac{(x+y)^2}{4} - \frac{(x-y)^2}{4}$ of two real numbers can be computed using two bootstrapping operations with the real function $z \mapsto \frac{z^2}{4}$.

This paper aims to present TFHE starting directly from its variant used in CONCRETE. It is mostly an overview of [3] and [4], although the approach is more algebraic.

2. A variant of TFHE

2.1. Learning with errors. TFHE is based on the learning with errors problem and its version on rings. The *learning with errors* (LWE) problem, introduced by Regev in [11], asks to recover a secret $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, given a system of m linear equations with small error terms e_1, \dots, e_m , such as the following

$$\begin{cases} a_{11}s_1 + a_{12}s_2 + \dots + a_{1n}s_n + e_1 = b_1 & (\text{mod } q) \\ a_{21}s_1 + a_{22}s_2 + \dots + a_{2n}s_n + e_2 = b_2 & (\text{mod } q) \\ \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{m1}s_1 + a_{m2}s_2 + \dots + a_{mn}s_n + e_m = b_m & (\text{mod } q) \end{cases}$$

where q and all a_{ij}, b_i are known. Of course, for a fixed value of $e = e_1 = \dots = e_m$, it is possible to derive s in polynomial time using Gaussian elimination. In general each e_i is randomly selected from a discretized gaussian distribution with mean zero and low standard deviation.

More generally, for a ring R , the *ring learning with errors* (RLWE) problem is to find $s \in R$, given many equations $b_i = a_i s + e_i$ where the a_i 's are uniformly random in R and the e_i 's are "small" in R [9]. The LWE and RLWE problems are considered hard and secure even against quantum attacks.

2.2. The encryption and decryption process. Following TFHE's implementation [4], CONCRETE encrypts plaintexts into LWE ciphertexts, and deals with RLWE ciphertexts for the bootstrapping.

Let $\mathbb{B} = \{0, 1\}$ and $q = 2^r$. The parameter r is called the *bit precision* (usually $r = 32$ or 64). For $0 < j < r - 1$, let

$$\mathcal{P} = \{\mu \in \mathbb{Z}_q \mid \mu = \mu_j \cdot 2^j + \dots + \mu_{r-1} \cdot 2^{r-1}, \mu_i \in \mathbb{B}\}$$

be the plaintext space and let $\mathcal{C} = \mathbb{Z}_q^{n+1}$ be the ciphertext space. We remark that \mathcal{P} is a subgroup of the additive group of \mathbb{Z}_q but, in general, it is not a subring of \mathbb{Z}_q . Consider then the set

$$\mathcal{U} = \{e \in \mathbb{Z}_q \mid e = \epsilon_0 \cdot 2^0 + \dots + \epsilon_{j-1} \cdot 2^{j-1}, \epsilon_i \in \mathbb{B}\}.$$

According to [3], for a secret key $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n) \in \mathbb{B}^n$ and a random mask $a = (a_1, \dots, a_n) \in \mathbb{Z}_q^n$, the encryption function is given by

$$\text{LWE}_s : (\mu, a, e) \in \mathcal{P} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathcal{U} \mapsto (a, b) \in \mathcal{C}$$

where

$$b = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i a_i + \mu + e \pmod{q}.$$

The element e is called *noise*.

Conversely, the decryption function is $\pi \circ \varphi$, where

$$(2.1) \quad \begin{aligned} \pi : \mathbb{Z}_q &\rightarrow \mathcal{P} \\ \mu_0 \cdot 2^0 + \dots + \mu_{r-1} \cdot 2^{r-1} &\mapsto \mu_j \cdot 2^j + \dots + \mu_{r-1} 2^{r-1} \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi : \mathcal{C} &\rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q \\ (a, b) &\mapsto b - \sum_{i=1}^n s_i a_i. \end{aligned}$$

In fact, if $b = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i a_i + \mu + e \pmod{q}$, then

$$\pi(\varphi(b)) = \pi(\mu + e) = \mu.$$

Actually $\pi(\mu + e) = 2^j \lfloor \frac{\mu+e}{2^j} \rfloor$, provided that $e < 2^{j-1}$ or $\epsilon_{j-1} = 0$; here $\lfloor \alpha \rfloor$ stands for the nearest integer to α . In fact, if

$$\mu + e = ((\mu_j \cdot 2^j + \dots + \mu_{r-1} \cdot 2^{r-1}) + \epsilon_0 \cdot 2^0 + \dots + \epsilon_{j-2} \cdot 2^{j-2}),$$

then

$$(2.2) \quad 2^j \left\lfloor \frac{\mu}{2^j} + \frac{e}{2^j} \right\rfloor = 2^j \left(\frac{\mu}{2^j} + \left\lfloor \frac{e}{2^j} \right\rfloor \right) = \mu.$$

For the ring setting, let $\mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x] = \mathbb{Z}_q[x]/I$ where $N > 1$ is a power of 2 and I is the ideal generated by the polynomial $x^N + 1$. Throughout, we will use the notation modulo I for the elements of $\mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]$.

Consider then the sets

$$\mathbb{Z}_N[x] = \{s(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x] \mid s(x) = s_0 + s_1x + \dots + s_{N-1}x^{N-1}, s_i \in \mathbb{B}\}$$

and

$$\mathcal{U}' = \{e(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x] \mid e(x) = e_0 + e_1x + \dots + e_{N-1}x^{N-1}, e_i \in \mathcal{U}\}.$$

Now the plaintext space is

$$\mathcal{P}' = \{\mu(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x] \mid \mu(x) = \mu_0 + \mu_1x + \dots + \mu_{N-1}x^{N-1}, \mu_i \in \mathcal{P}\}$$

and the ciphertext space is $\mathcal{C}' = \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{k+1}$.

As above, for a secret key $s(x) = (s_1(x), \dots, s_k(x)) \in \mathbb{Z}_N[x]^k$ and a public random mask $a(x) = (a_1(x), \dots, a_k(x)) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^k$, the encryption function is given by

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RLWE}_{s(x)} : \mathcal{P}' \times \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^k \times \mathcal{U}' &\rightarrow \mathcal{C}' \\ (\mu(x), a(x), e(x)) &\mapsto (a(x), b(x)) \end{aligned}$$

where

$$b(x) = \sum_{i=1}^k s_i(x)a_i(x) + \mu(x) + e(x)$$

and $e(x)$ is the noise.

The decryption function is $\pi' \circ \varphi'$ where

$$\begin{aligned} \pi' : \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x] &\rightarrow \mathcal{P}' \\ \alpha_0 + \dots + \alpha_{N-1}x^{N-1} &\mapsto \pi(\alpha_0) + \dots + \pi(\alpha_{N-1})x^{N-1}, \end{aligned}$$

and

$$\begin{aligned} \varphi' : \mathcal{C}' &\rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x] \\ (a(x), b(x)) &\mapsto b(x) - \sum_{i=1}^k s_i(x)a_i(x). \end{aligned}$$

If $b(x) = \sum_{i=1}^k s_i(x)a_i(x) + \mu(x) + e(x)$, then

$$\pi'(\varphi'(b(x))) = \pi'(\mu(x) + e(x)).$$

On the other hand,

$$\mu(x) + e(x) = (\mu_0 + e_0) + (\mu_1 + e_1)x + \dots + (\mu_{N-1} + e_{N-1})x^{N-1}$$

with $\mu_i \in \mathcal{P}$ and $e_i \in \mathcal{U}$. Since $\pi(\mu_i + e_i) = \mu_i$ for any i , we have $\pi'(\mu(x) + e(x)) = \mu(x)$.

2.3. The encoding and decoding process. CONCRETE allows to work with real numbers, encoding any real number of a closed interval $\mathcal{I} = [a, b]$ with an element of \mathcal{P} . Of course, a decoding function is applied after decryption. There are two different ways for the encoding/decoding process.

Let h be an integer such that $0 < j \leq h \leq r - 1$, and set

$$\mathcal{M} = \{\mu^* \in \mathbb{Z}_q \mid \mu^* = \mu_0 \cdot 2^0 + \dots + \mu_h \cdot 2^h, \mu_i \in \mathbb{B}\}.$$

Define the function $\psi : \mathcal{I} \rightarrow \mathcal{M}$ by the rule

$$\psi(y) = \left\lfloor 2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1) \frac{y - a}{b - a} \right\rfloor.$$

The integer $h - j + 1$ represents the number of bits reserved to store y , while j is the number of bits reserved to the noise. Note that $2^{h-j+1} - 1 = 1 \cdot 2^{h-j} + 1 \cdot 2^{h-j-1} + \dots + 1 \cdot 2^0$, hence

$$2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1) = 1 \cdot 2^j + \dots + 1 \cdot 2^{h-1} + 1 \cdot 2^h.$$

Obviously, $2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1) \frac{y-a}{b-a} \leq 2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1)$. Thus

$$\left\lfloor 2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1) \frac{y-a}{b-a} \right\rfloor = \mu_0 \cdot 2^0 + \dots + \mu_h \cdot 2^h \in \mathcal{M}.$$

The first encoding function is then $E_1 = \pi \circ \psi$, where π is defined as in (2.1) and therefore $\pi(\mu_0 \cdot 2^0 + \dots + \mu_h \cdot 2^h) = \mu_j \cdot 2^j + \dots + \mu_h \cdot 2^h \in \mathcal{P}$.

The decoding function is

$$D_1 : \mathcal{M} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$$

$$\mu^* \mapsto a + \frac{\mu^*(b-a)}{2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1)}.$$

Actually $a + \frac{\mu^*(b-a)}{2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1)} \in \mathcal{I}$. In fact, if $a + \frac{\mu^*(b-a)}{2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1)} > b$ then $\mu^* > 2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1)$, which is impossible. Moreover, $D_1(E_1(y)) \approx y$ for any $y \in \mathcal{I}$.

The second encoding function is

$$E_2 : \mathcal{I} \rightarrow \mathcal{P}$$

$$y \mapsto 2^j \left\lfloor (2^{h-j+1} - 1) \frac{y-a}{b-a} \right\rfloor.$$

Since $(2^{h-j+1} - 1) \frac{y-a}{b-a} \leq (2^{h-j+1} - 1)$, we have

$$\left\lfloor (2^{h-j+1} - 1) \frac{y-a}{b-a} \right\rfloor = \mu_0 \cdot 2^0 + \dots + \mu_{h-j} \cdot 2^{h-j} \in \mathcal{M}$$

and so $2^j \left\lfloor (2^{h-j+1} - 1) \frac{y-a}{b-a} \right\rfloor \in \mathcal{P}$.

In this case, the decoding function is

$$D_2 : \mathcal{P} \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$$

$$\mu \mapsto a + \frac{\mu(b-a)}{2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1)}.$$

Of course $a + \frac{\mu(b-a)}{2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1)} < b$, otherwise $\mu > 2^j(2^{h-j+1} - 1)$, and as before $D_2(E_2(m)) \approx y$ for any $y \in \mathcal{I}$.

3. Operations on ciphertexts

Two LWE ciphertexts can easily be added, but their sum could be a noisy LWE ciphertext. In order to bootstrap such a ciphertext and hence reduce its noise, in [2], following the GSW construction [8], the authors introduced an “external product” of an RLWE ciphertext by a new type of ciphertext, the

RGSW ciphertext, which will be defined in Section 3.3. The result is an approximation of an RLWE ciphertext. This operation depends on some properties of the gadget matrix [10].

3.1. Addition of LWE ciphertexts. In $\mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathbb{Z}_q$ we define $(a^{(1)}, b_1) + (a^{(2)}, b_2) = (a^{(1)} + a^{(2)}, b_1 + b_2)$, where $a^{(1)} + a^{(2)}$ is the componentwise addition. Let

$$\text{LWE}_s(\mu_1, a^{(1)}, e_1) = \left(a^{(1)}, \sum_{i=1}^n s_i a_i^{(1)} + \mu_1 + e_1 \right) = (a^{(1)}, b_1)$$

and

$$\text{LWE}_s(\mu_2, a^{(2)}, e_2) = \left(a^{(2)}, \sum_{i=1}^n s_i a_i^{(2)} + \mu_2 + e_2 \right) = (a^{(2)}, b_2).$$

Then, provided that $e_1 + e_2 \in \mathcal{U}$, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{LWE}_s(\mu_1 + \mu_2, a^{(1)} + a^{(2)}, e_1 + e_2) = \\ &\left(a^{(1)} + a^{(2)}, \sum_{i=1}^n s_i (a_i^{(1)} + a_i^{(2)}) + (\mu_1 + \mu_2) + (e_1 + e_2) \right) = (a^{(1)} + a^{(2)}, b_1 + b_2). \end{aligned}$$

This shows that TFHE is somewhat homomorphic with respect to the addition.

Note also that, for any $(\mu, a, e) \in \mathcal{P} \times \mathbb{Z}_q^n \times \mathcal{U}$ and any $h \geq 0$ such that $h\mu \in \mathcal{P}$ and $he \in \mathcal{U}$, we have

$$\begin{aligned} h \cdot \text{LWE}_s(\mu, a, e) &= \underbrace{\text{LWE}_s(\mu, a, e) + \dots + \text{LWE}_s(\mu, a, e)}_h \\ &= \left(ha, \sum_{i=1}^n s_i ha_i + h\mu + he \right) = \text{LWE}_s(ha, h\mu, he). \end{aligned}$$

Obviously, if $h < 0$, then $h \cdot \text{LWE}_s(\mu, a, e) = (-h) \cdot (-\text{LWE}_s(\mu, a, e)) = (-h) \cdot \text{LWE}_s(-\mu, -a, -e)$.

3.2. The gadget matrix. Given the positive integers k, l, β , with $l\beta \leq r$, and the element $g = (2^{r-\beta}, 2^{r-2\beta}, \dots, 2^{r-l\beta}) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^l$, let consider the following block diagonal matrix, also known as the *gadget matrix*,

$$G^T = \text{diag}(\underbrace{g^T, \dots, g^T}_{k+1}) = \begin{pmatrix} g^T & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & g^T & \dots & 0 \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ 0 & 0 & \dots & g^T \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{(k+1)l \times (k+1)}.$$

Let $d \in \mathbb{Z}_q$. We can see d as an integer in $(-\frac{q}{2}, \frac{q}{2}]$: in fact, if $d > \frac{q}{2}$, then $d = \frac{q}{2} + \alpha$ for some $0 < \alpha < \frac{q}{2}$; but d is congruent to $d - q = \alpha - \frac{q}{2}$ modulo q , where $-\frac{q}{2} < \alpha - \frac{q}{2} < 0$. Write next the representation of $\lfloor 2^{l\beta} \frac{d}{q} \rfloor$ to the base 2^β , taking into account that $-2^{l\beta-1} \leq 2^{l\beta} \frac{d}{q} \leq 2^{l\beta-1}$:

$$\left\lfloor 2^{l\beta} \frac{d}{q} \right\rfloor = \delta_0 + \delta_1 2^\beta + \dots + \delta_{l-1} 2^{(l-1)\beta}.$$

Naturally each $\delta_i \in \mathbb{Z}$ is such that $-2^\beta < \delta_i < 2^\beta$. Then we have the following approximation of d :

$$d \approx \frac{q}{2^{l\beta}} \left\lfloor 2^{l\beta} \frac{d}{q} \right\rfloor = 2^{r-l\beta} \left\lfloor 2^{l\beta} \frac{d}{q} \right\rfloor = \delta_0 2^{r-l\beta} + \delta_1 2^{r-(l-1)\beta} + \dots + \delta_{l-1} 2^{r-\beta}$$

or, equivalently, $d \approx \sum_{i=1}^l d_i 2^{r-i\beta} = g^{-1}(d)g^T$ with $g^{-1}(d) = (d_1, \dots, d_l) = (\delta_{l-1}, \dots, \delta_0)$.

By extension, for a polynomial $a(x) = a_0 + a_1x + \dots + a_{N-1}x^{N-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]$, we set $g^{-1}(a_j) = (d_{j1}, \dots, d_{jl})$ and

$$g^{-1}(a(x)) = \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} g^{-1}(a_j)x^j = \left(\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} d_{j1}x^j, \dots, \sum_{j=0}^{N-1} d_{jl}x^j \right).$$

Since $a_j \approx \sum_{i=1}^l d_{ji}2^{r-i\beta}$, it follows that

$$\begin{aligned} a(x) &\approx \sum_{i=1}^l d_{0i}2^{r-i\beta} + \sum_{i=1}^l d_{1i}2^{r-i\beta}x + \dots + \sum_{i=1}^l d_{(N-1)i}2^{r-i\beta}x^{N-1} \\ &= \left(\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} d_{j1}x^j \right) 2^{r-\beta} + \left(\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} d_{j2}x^j \right) 2^{r-2\beta} + \dots + \left(\sum_{j=0}^{N-1} d_{jl}x^j \right) 2^{r-l\beta} \\ &= g^{-1}(a(x))g^T. \end{aligned}$$

More generally, consider the function $G^{-1} : \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{k+1} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{(k+1)l}$ such that

$$G^{-1}(a_1(x), \dots, a_{k+1}(x)) = (g^{-1}(a_1(x)), \dots, g^{-1}(a_{k+1}(x))),$$

for any $(a_1(x), \dots, a_{k+1}(x)) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{k+1}$. Thus

$$\begin{aligned} (3.1) \quad G^{-1}(a_1(x), \dots, a_{k+1}(x))G^T &= (g^{-1}(a_1(x))g^T, \dots, g^{-1}(a_{k+1}(x))g^T) \\ &\approx (a_1(x), \dots, a_{k+1}(x)). \end{aligned}$$

3.3. RGSW ciphertexts. An RGSW ciphertext is a matrix encrypting a polynomial in $\mathbb{Z}_N[x]$. Unlike TFHE, we deal here with the particular case where the polynomial is 0 or 1.

With k and l as in 3.2, set $\bar{k} = (k + 1)l$. For a secret key $s(x) = (s_1(x), \dots, s_k(x)) \in \mathbb{Z}_N[x]^k$, let

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(0, a_{11}(x), \dots, a_{1k}(x), e_1(x)) &= (0, a_{11}(x), \dots, a_{1k}(x), b_1(x)) \\ &\vdots \\ \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(0, a_{\bar{k}1}(x), \dots, a_{\bar{k}k}(x), e_{\bar{k}}(x)) &= (0, a_{\bar{k}1}(x), \dots, a_{\bar{k}k}(x), b_{\bar{k}}(x)) \end{aligned}$$

where each $b_i(x) = \sum_{j=1}^k s_j(x)a_{ij}(x) + e_i(x)$ for some $e_i(x) \in \mathcal{U}'$. Taking

$$Z = \begin{pmatrix} a_{11}(x) & \cdots & a_{1k}(x) & b_1(x) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \vdots \\ a_{\bar{k}1}(x) & \cdots & a_{\bar{k}k}(x) & b_{\bar{k}}(x) \end{pmatrix} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{\bar{k} \times (k+1)},$$

we define a new encryption function, as follows

$$\begin{aligned} \text{RGSW}_{s(x)} : \mathbb{B} &\rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{(k+1)l \times (k+1)} \\ m &\mapsto Z + mG^T. \end{aligned}$$

For a matrix $C = (c_1(x), \dots, c_{\bar{k}}(x)) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{1 \times \bar{k}}$, we remark that

$$CZ = \left(\sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)a_{i1}(x), \dots, \sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)a_{ik}(x), \sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)b_i(x) \right)$$

where

$$\begin{aligned} \sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)b_i(x) &= \sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x) \left(\sum_{j=1}^k s_j(x)a_{ij}(x) + e_i(x) \right) \\ &= \sum_{j=1}^k s_j(x) \left(\sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)a_{ij}(x) \right) + \sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)e_i(x). \end{aligned}$$

This implies that, up to the noise, CZ can be seen as an $\text{RLWE}_{s(x)}$ ciphertext. In fact,

$$(3.2) \quad CZ = \text{RLWE}_{s(x)} \left(0, \sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)a_{i1}(x), \dots, \sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)a_{ik}(x), \sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)e_i(x) \right)$$

provided that $\sum_{i=1}^{\bar{k}} c_i(x)e_i(x) \in \mathcal{U}'$.

3.4. External product of ciphertexts. Given $m \in \mathbb{B}$, $\mu(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]$ and a secret key $s(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_N[x]^k$, put $\mathcal{C}_m = \text{RGSW}_{s(x)}(m)$ and let $c_{\mu(x)}$ be the RLWE ciphertext of $\mu(x)$ encrypted using $s(x)$. Denote by $\mathcal{C}_m \square c_{\mu(x)}$ the matrix multiplication of $G^{-1}(c_{\mu(x)}) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{(k+1)l}$ by $\mathcal{C}_m \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^{(k+1)l \times (k+1)}$. We claim that, if the noise keeps “small”, then $\mathcal{C}_m \square c_{\mu(x)}$ is an approximation of $\text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(m\mu(x), a'(x), e'(x))$, for some $a'(x) \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]^k$ and $e'(x) \in \mathcal{U}'$.

First, note that

$$G^{-1}(c_{\mu(x)})\mathcal{C}_m = G^{-1}(c_{\mu(x)})(Z + mG^T) = G^{-1}(c_{\mu(x)})Z + m(G^{-1}(c_{\mu(x)})G^T).$$

According to (3.2), we may assume that $G^{-1}(c_{\mu(x)})Z = \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(0, a(x), e(x))$ for some $a(x)$ and $e(x)$. On the other hand, we saw in (3.1) that $G^{-1}(c_{\mu(x)})G^T \approx c_{\mu(x)}$. Therefore

$$\mathcal{C}_m \square c_{\mu(x)} \approx \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(0, a(x), e(x)) + mc_{\mu(x)}.$$

In particular, if $\text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(0, a(x), e(x)) = (a(x), \sum_{i=1}^k s_i(x)a_i(x) + e_i(x))$,

$$c_{\mu(x)} = \left(\bar{a}(x), \sum_{i=1}^k s_i(x)\bar{a}_i(x) + \mu(x) + \bar{e}_i(x) \right)$$

and $e(x) + m\bar{e}_i(x) \in \mathcal{U}'$, we conclude that

$$(3.3) \quad \mathcal{C}_m \boxplus c_{\mu(x)} \approx \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(m\mu(x), a(x) + m\bar{a}(x), e(x) + m\bar{e}_i(x)),$$

as claimed.

4. Bootstrapping algorithms

In TFHE the bootstrapping procedure involves two main algorithms, the blind rotation and the sample extraction. The blind rotation requires first a switch modulus algorithm to scale by $\frac{2N}{q}$ each component of the LWE ciphertext. Whereas the sample extraction is usually followed by a key switching algorithm which converts a ciphertext under a key into a ciphertext under another key.

4.1. Blind rotation. Let $b = \sum_{i=1}^n s_i a_i + \mu^*$, with $\mu^* = \mu + e$, be a noisy LWE ciphertext corresponding to the mask (a_1, \dots, a_n) , and let consider the so-called *test polynomial*

$$t(x) = t_0 + t_1x + \dots + t_{N-1}x^{N-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x],$$

where each $t_j = \pi(\frac{q}{2N}j)$ and π is defined as in (2.1). Suppose further that b has at least one bit of padding left, that is $b < 2^{r-1}$. Then $\mu^* < 2^{r-1}$ and so, arguing as in (2.2), we obtain $\bar{\mu}^* = \lfloor \frac{2N}{q}\mu^* \rfloor \leq N - 1$. Hence, $t_{\bar{\mu}^*} = \mu$.

The blind rotation consists in finding an RLWE ciphertext of the polynomial $x^{-\bar{\mu}^*}t(x)$, whose constant term is actually $t_{\bar{\mu}^*}$. In what follows we will rely on

$$\tilde{\mu}^* = \bar{b} - \sum_{i=1}^n s_i \bar{a}_i,$$

where $\bar{b} = \lfloor \frac{2N}{q}b \rfloor$ and $\bar{a}_i = \lfloor \frac{2N}{q}a_i \rfloor$. This approximation may produce a small additional error, which is called *drift*.

Let $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n)$ and $s(x) = (s_1(x), \dots, s_k(x))$ be the secret keys used to encrypt the input LWE ciphertexts and RLWE ciphertexts, respectively. Then the *bootstrapping key* is defined to be a list of n RGSW ciphertexts, each one encrypting s_i , namely by

$$(\mathcal{C}_{s_1}, \dots, \mathcal{C}_{s_n}) = (\text{RGSW}_{s(x)}(s_1), \dots, \text{RGSW}_{s(x)}(s_n)).$$

Define recursively

$$c_i = \mathcal{C}_{s_i} \boxplus (x^{\bar{a}_i}c_{i-1} - c_{i-1}) + c_{i-1},$$

where

$$c_0 = (\underbrace{0, \dots, 0}_k, x^{-\bar{b}}t(x)) = \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(x^{-\bar{b}}t(x), \underbrace{0, \dots, 0}_{k+1}).$$

Then, for any $j \in \{1, \dots, n\}$, we get

$$c_j \approx \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(x^{-\bar{b} + \sum_{i=1}^j s_i \bar{a}_i} t(x), a(x), e(x))$$

for some $a(x)$ and $e(x)$. In fact, applying (3.3) with $m = s_j$ and $s_0 = 0$, we have

$$\begin{aligned}
 c_j &\approx \mathcal{C}_{s_j} \boxplus \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}((x^{a_j} - 1)x^{-\bar{b} + \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} s_i \bar{a}_i} t(x), a(x), e(x)) + \\
 &\quad \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(x^{-\bar{b} + \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} s_i \bar{a}_i} t(x), a(x), e(x)) \\
 &\approx \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(s_j(x^{a_j} - 1)x^{-\bar{b} + \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} s_i \bar{a}_i} t(x), a'(x), e'(x)) + \\
 &\quad \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(x^{-\bar{b} + \sum_{i=1}^{j-1} s_i \bar{a}_i} t(x), a(x), e(x)) \\
 &= \begin{cases} \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(x^{-\bar{b} + \sum_{i=1}^j s_i \bar{a}_i} t(x), a'(x), e'(x)) & \text{if } s_j = 0 \\ \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(x^{-\bar{b} + \sum_{i=1}^j s_i \bar{a}_i} t(x), a''(x), e''(x)) & \text{if } s_j = 1. \end{cases}
 \end{aligned}$$

In particular,

$$(4.1) \quad c_n \approx \text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(u(x), a(x), e(x))$$

where $u(x) = x^{-\tilde{\mu}^*} t(x) = u_0 + u_1x + \dots + u_{N-1}x^{N-1}$ and $u_0 = t_{\tilde{\mu}^*}$ is an approximation of μ . Therefore c_n is the desired RLWE ciphertext.

4.2. Sample extraction. The next step is to extract u_0 , as an LWE ciphertext of μ with less noise than b . With the same notation of 4.1, let

$$\text{RLWE}_{s(x)}(u(x), a(x), e(x)) = (a_1(x), \dots, a_k(x), b(x))$$

and, for any $1 \leq i \leq k$, put

$$\begin{aligned}
 s_i(x) &= s_{i,0} + s_{i,1}x + \dots + s_{i,N-1}x^{N-1}, \\
 a_i(x) &= a_{i,0} + a_{i,1}x + \dots + a_{i,N-1}x^{N-1}, \\
 e(x) &= e_0 + e_1x + \dots + e_{N-1}x^{N-1}.
 \end{aligned}$$

Then

$$\begin{aligned}
 b(x) &= \sum_{i=1}^k s_i(x)a_i(x) + u(x) + e(x) \\
 &= b_0 + b_1x + \dots + b_{N-1}x^{N-1}
 \end{aligned}$$

where, since $x^N = -1$ in $\mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x]$, we have

$$b_0 = \left(\sum_{i=1}^k s_{i,0}a_{i,0} - (s_{i,1}a_{i,N-1} + \dots + s_{i,N-1}a_{i,1}) \right) + u_0 + e_0.$$

Taking

$$s' = (s_{1,0}, s_{1,1}, \dots, s_{1,N-1}, \dots, s_{k,0}, s_{k,1}, \dots, s_{k,N-1}),$$

it follows that

$$\text{LWE}_{s'}(a_{1,0}, -a_{1,N-1}, \dots, -a_{1,1}, \dots, a_{k,0}, -a_{k,N-1}, \dots, -a_{k,1}, u_0, e_0) = (a_{1,0}, -a_{1,N-1}, \dots, -a_{1,1}, \dots, a_{k,0}, -a_{k,N-1}, \dots, -a_{k,1}, b_0).$$

Hence, with the above mask, b_0 can be seen as an LWE ciphertext of u_0 under the key s' . In [2], in order to convert b_0 into an LWE ciphertext of u_0 under the key $s = (s_1, \dots, s_n)$, a key switching algorithm is applied. This technique is similar to the bootstrapping (see [4, Appendix A]) but it slightly makes the noise increase. For simplicity, since the parameters (n, N) are usually chosen such that $n \leq N$, we avoid the key switching assuming $s_1(x) = \dots = s_k(x) = s_1 + s_2x + \dots + s_nx^{n-1}$. So, for example, if $k = 2$ then $s' = (s_1, \dots, s_n, \underbrace{0, \dots, 0}_{N-n}, s_1, \dots, s_n, \underbrace{0, \dots, 0}_{N-n})$ and

$$b_0 = s_1a_{1,0} - s_1a_{1,N-1} - \dots - s_1a_{1,N-(n-1)} + s_2a_{2,0} - s_2a_{2,N-1} - \dots - s_2a_{2,N-(n-1)} + u_0 + e_0,$$

that is

$$\begin{aligned} &\text{LWE}_{s'}(a_{1,0}, -a_{1,N-1}, \dots, -a_{1,1}, \dots, a_{k,0}, -a_{k,N-1}, \dots, -a_{k,1}, u_0, e_0) = \\ &\text{LWE}_s(a_{1,0}, -a_{1,N-1}, \dots, -a_{1,N-(n-1)}, a_{2,0}, -a_{2,N-1}, \dots, -a_{2,N-(n-1)}, u_0, e_0) = \\ &(a_{1,0}, -a_{1,N-1}, \dots, -a_{1,N-(n-1)}, a_{2,0}, -a_{2,N-1}, \dots, -a_{2,N-(n-1)}, b_0). \end{aligned}$$

4.3. Programmable bootstrapping. Given a function $f_q : \mathbb{Z}_q \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, suppose now that the initial test polynomial is

$$t(x) = t_0 + t_1x + \dots + t_{N-1}x^{N-1} \in \mathbb{Z}_{q,N}[x],$$

where $t_j = f_q(\pi(\frac{q}{2N}j))$. Thus, as in 4.1, we obtain that the constant term of the polynomial $u(x) = x^{-\tilde{\mu}^*}t(x)$ in (4.1) is $t_{\tilde{\mu}^*}$, namely $f_q(\mu)$ up to the drift. Hence, in this case, the bootstrapping transforms a ciphertext of μ into a ciphertext of $f_q(\mu)$ with a lesser noise. Furthermore, by using the encoding/decoding functions defined in 2.3, it is possible to evaluate any real-valued function of a real variable, say $f : \mathcal{I} \rightarrow \mathcal{J}$. In fact, it is enough to take $f_q = E'_i \circ f \circ D_i$ where $i = 1$ or 2 , $E'_i : \mathcal{J} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $D_i : \mathbb{Z}_q \rightarrow \mathcal{I}$. So, if $D'_i : \mathcal{J} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$ and $\mu = E_i(x)$ with $E_i : \mathcal{I} \rightarrow \mathbb{Z}_q$, then $f_q(\mu) \approx E'_i(f(x))$ from which it follows that $D'_i(f_q(\mu)) \approx f(x)$.

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